

Message Text

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00084 01 OF 02 180932Z

21

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EUR-25 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 NEA-14 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01 SAM-01 H-03

NSC-07 SS-20 EB-11 COME-00 SCI-06 DRC-01 /183 W

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R 180830Z JUN 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 145

SECDEF

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0084

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: REPORT OF JUNE 13,

1974 MEETING BETWEEN POLISH VICE-

MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND

CANADIAN REP

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MEMO OF BILATERAL MEETING BETWEEN

POLISH VICE-MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS BYZTYGA AND

CANADIAN REP AMB GRANDE WHICH WAS CIRCULATED

BY CANADIAN REP AT JUNE 17 AHG MEETING.

BEGIN TEXT.

CANADIAN REP HAD A CAFE MEETING WITH BYZTYGA JUNE 13 AT WHICH

INTER ALIA HE MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS WHICH MAY BE OF SOME INTER-

EST TO YOU. (HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY POLISH REP STRULAK WHO HAD AR-

RANGED THE MEETING, AT THE SUGGESTION OF THE CANADIAN REP WHEN HE WAS

TOLD THAT BYZTYGA WOULD BE IN VIENNA FOR A FEW DAYS);

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00084 01 OF 02 180932Z

(A) HE STARTED OFF BY DESCRIBING WHAT HIS PRESENT RESPONSIBILITIES WERE

POINTING OUT THAT HE HAD MANY MORE GREY HAIRS THAN AT HIS FIRST MEETING WITH CANADIAN REP IN OTTAWA A YEAR AND A HALF AGO, AND THAT HIS GREATEST TROUBLES CAME FROM HIS RESPONSIBILITY FOR INFORMATION AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS. HIS OTHER TWO RESPONSIBILITIES WERE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND FOR POLICY PLANNING. THE FORMER GAVE HIM PRACTICALLY NO PROBLEM AT ALL. IT WAS IN THE LATTER CONTEXT THAT HE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR CSCE AND MBFR.

(B) AMONG HIS MORE GENERAL REMARKS HE RATHER BOASTED THAT POLAND WAS THE NUMBER TWO COUNTRY OF THE WARSAW PACT. WHEN ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION HE SAID THIS WAS NOT IN AN INDUSTRIAL SENSE (EAST GERMANY WAS OBVIOUSLY MUCH STRONGER IN THAT WAY) BUT IN A MILITARY AS WELL AS A POLITICAL SENSE. BYZTYGA THEN CLAIMED CREDIT FOR DRAFTING THE WP MBFR DRAFT AGREEMENT TOGETHER WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS.

(C) BYZTYGA DREW ON A NAPKIN A LINE DIVIDING EAST AND WEST EUROPE WITH THE SOVIET ARMY ON ONE SIDE AND THE USA ON THE OTHER. HE CLAIMED THAT THE SOVIET ARMY WAS DIRECTED BOTH WESTWARD AND EASTWARD "AT THE GDR". AT THE SAME TIME HE SAID THAT POLAND WAS NOT AT ALL WORRIED ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF USA FORCES IN EUROPE.

(D) HE THEN DREW A CIRCLE CONTAINING A NUMBER OF DOTS CLAIMING THAT THIS REPRESENTED THE ONE AGREEMENT WHICH WE SHOULD REACH HERE AND THE DOTS REPRESENTED ITS VARIOUS ELEMENTS OR STAGES. AT THE SAME TIME HE SPOKE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS PROCEEDING "STEP BY STEP" AT WHICH POINT STRULAK SMILED AND SAID THAT CANADIAN REP HAD USED THIS EXPRESSION IN AN EARLIER SPEECH. (AS YOU KNOW THIS IS NATO TERM AND NOT THAT OF THE WP). LATER, WHEN PRODDED BY STRULAK, BYZTYGA ADMITTED THAT THERE COULD BE MORE THAN ONE AGREEMENT BUT THAT THE IMPORTANT THING WAS WHAT WAS IN THESE AGREEMENTS. NEVERTHELESS HE STILL SEEMED TO FAVOUR ONE OVERALL AGREEMENT CONTAINING A NUMBER OF STAGES AND HE MADE NO MENTION WHATSOEVER OF THE WP SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL. (E) BYZTYGA INEVITABLY (BUT ONLY LATE IN OUR CONVERSATION) REFERRED TO THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE INCLUSION OF THE BUNDESWEHR IN REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET. HE EMPHASIZED THAT FOR POLAND THIS WAS A "POLITICAL" CONFERENCE RATHER THAN A MILITARY ONE. POLAND'S INTEREST WAS IN CONTINUING THE PROCESS OF CONSULTATION AND NEGOTIATION WHICH HE CLAIMED COULD NEVER BE REVERSED NOW THAT IT HAD STARTED.

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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00084 01 OF 02 180932Z

(F) BYZTYGA SEEMED IN NO HURRY TO BRING OUR CONFERENCE TO AN EARLY CONCLUSION CLAIMING, AT THE SAME TIME, THAT NO SINGLE COUNTRY WOULD EVER DARE TO WITHDRAW NOW THAT WE WERE INVOLVED IN ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS.

(G) BYZTYGA SAID THAT FOR POLAND MBFR WAS PRIMARILY A POLITICAL OPERATION WHEREAS FOR THE RUSSIANS IT WAS MORE A POLITICAL CUM MILITARY ONE.

(H) BYZTYGA SAID THAT MBFR WAS MORE IMPORTANT FOR POLAND

THAT THE CSCE IN GENEVA FROM WHICH HE HAD RECENTLY
RETURNED FROM A TEN DAY VISIT (MORE LATER).
(I) THE VICE-MINISTER PRAISED OUR ACHIEVEMENTS HERE IN VIENNA.
HE SAID WE HAD GOT MUCH FARTHER SO FAR THAN HE HAD EVER
EXPECTED. HE ESPECIALLY MENTIONED SEVERAL TIMES THE
IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHED TO OUR DEVELOPMENT OF A PRAGMATIC
PRACTICAL METHOD OF NEGOTIATING (MEANING OUR INFORMAL
MEETINGS) WHICH HE CONTRASTED TO GENEVA WHERE NO SUCH
METHOD HAD BEEN DEVELOPED. IT WAS ONLY IN SUCH A WAY
THAT THE GIVE AND TAKE OF NEGOTIATIONS COULD ACHIEVE
COMPROMISES AND RESULTS. FURTHER THE FACT THAT WE ARE
TALKING TOGETHER IN GOOD FAITH AND HAVE GOOD PERSONAL
RELATIONS IS A VERY GOOD THING IN ITSELF AND CONTRIBUTES
TO DETENTE.
(J) BYZTYGA MADE ONLY ONE PASSING REFERENCE TO THE INCLUSION
OF NUCLEAR AND AIR AND NEVER RETURNED TO THIS SUBJECT.
(K) BYZTYGA AND STRULAK BOTH CLAIMED THAT THEY WERE NOT
WORRIED ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF CANADIAN FORCES IN
EUROPE.

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00084 02 OF 02 180943Z

21

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0084

FROM US REP MBFR

2. THROUGHOUT OUR CONVERSATION CANADIAN REP STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACHED TO PHASING AND SPELLED OUT THE VARIOUS CLARIFICATIONS AND ADDITIONAL POINTS WHICH WE HAD MADE ON LINKAGE, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE EASTER RECESS, TO TRY TO RESPOND TO THE WP'S WORRIES ABOUT A SECOND STAGE PRODUCING RESULTS, ETC. CANADIAN REP POINTED TO BYZTYGAS DRAWING OF TWO CIRCLES WITH A LINE BETWEEN AND EMPHASIZED THAT IF THAT LINE (LINK) WAS STRONG ENOUGH THEN SURELY THIS WOULD BE JUST AS GOOD AS HIS ONCE CIRCLE DRAWING. CANADIAN REP ALSO, OF COURSE, EMPHASIZED THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET AND USA FORCES AND THE REDUCTION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN FORCES WHICH WAS A MUCH MORE DIFFICULT THING TO AGREE TO AND WHICH REQUIRED THE CONFIDENCE WHICH COULD BE GENERATED BY PRIOR USA/SOVIET WITHDRAWALS.

3. AT THE END CANADIAN REP EMPHASIZED THAT OUR MASTERS WERE EXTREMELY FIRM IN INSISTING THAT USA AND SOVIET TROOPS MUST BE REDUCED FIRST THROUGH A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT. BYZTYGA NODDED AND TOOK THIS IN WITHOUT ATTEMPTING TO REFUTE IT.
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00084 02 OF 02 180943Z

4. OTHER GLEANINGS WHICH CANADIAN REP OBTAINED FROM BYZTYGA WERE THAT POLAND WAS NOT WORRIED ABOUT ITS MILITARY BUDGET AND DID NOT REQUIRE ANY REDUCTION IN IT WHICH MIGHT RESULT FROM TROOP REDUCTIONS. BYZTYGA ALSO SAID THAT POLAND DID NOT WISH TO INCREASE ITS FORCES WHICH COULD BE A POSSIBLE RESULT OF SOVIET WITHDRAWALS FROM CENTRAL EUROPE.

5. HE ALSO SAID THAT ORIGINALLY HE THOUGHT TROOP REDUCTIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE ALL OVER EUROPE BUT THAT HE HAD IN THE END COME TO REALIZE THAT WE SHOULD FIRST CONCENTRATE ON CENTRAL EUROPE AS THIS WOULD BE A MUCH MORE MANAGEABLE NEGOTIATION. FURTHER, THIS PUT POLAND RIGHT IN THE CENTER OF THE AREA AND FROM POLAND'S POINT OF VIEW, THIS WAS A VERY GOOD THING POLITICALLY. THE POLISH PEOPLE SUPPORTED THIS. THE INFERENCE, WAS THAT THIS EMPHASIZED TO BOTH SIDES THE IMPORTANCE OF POLAND AND ITS EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE TENSIONS AND PROMOTE DETENTE, WHICH WAS AN IRREVERSIBLE PROCESS.

6. CSCE. ALTHOUGH WE DID NOT GET INTO A DETAILED DISCUSSION ABOUT CSCE, BYZTYGA HAD HEARD OF THE RECENT SOVIET APPROACH IN CAPITALS AND THEIR SUGGESTION THAT MORE SENIOR OFFICIALS SHOULD ATTEMPT TO WIND UP STAGE TWO. HE CLAIMED THAT HIS IMPRESSION FROM HIS RECENT STAY IN GENEVA WAS THAT THE EXPERTS WERE GETTING FAR TOO INVOLVED IN DETAILS AND ON THE OTHER HAND, THE POLITICAL PEOPLE BACK HOME SIMPLY DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT THE DELAYS WERE ALL ABOUT AND WHAT CONCESSIONS WERE NECESSARY TO WIND UP STAGE TWO. IN OTHER WORDS THERE WAS A GAP WHICH PERHAPS SENIOR OFFICIALS OR SENIOR POLITICAL APPOINTEES COULD FILL IF THEY WERE TO GO TO GENEVA

AND TAKE OVER THE NEGOTIATIONS.

7. WE HAD SOME DISCUSSION OF BASKET THREE AND CANADIAN REP
EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE WHICH WE ATTACHED TO IT. HE CLAIMED THAT THE

SOVIETS SIMPLY COULD NOT MAKE ANY MAJOR CONCESSIONS IN THIS AREA. THE
INDICATION FROM THIS WAS THAT THEY COULD POSSIBLY MAKE SOME
MINOR ONES.

8. ON THE WHOLE BYZTYGA SEEMED DISCOURAGED ABOUT GENEVA
BUT MUCH MORE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT VIENNA. HE REALIZED, OF COURSE,
THAT OUR CONFERENCE HERE WOULD TAKE A GREAT DEAL OF TIME BUT
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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00084 02 OF 02 180943Z

THIS DID NOT SEEM TO DISTURB HIM ONE BIT.
END TEXT.RESOR

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